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does not impair his right of recovery for such breach." A minority of
cases except railroads and public highways, and, as to them, hold that
knowledge on the part of the grantee of the right of way will estop him
from asserting its existence.' However, as to private easements and
rights of way over land, it is well settled that even when the grantee
has knowledge of their existence at the time of conveyance, the grantor
is not relieved from liability.' The instant case follows this accepted
doctrine and its decision is in conformity with all jurisdictions.
R.W.C.
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATIONS DE FACTO UNDER THE OHIO ACT-
LIABILITY OF INCORPORATORS
One of the significant changes made in the General Corporation
Act by the 1939 legislative session is to be found in section 8623-117
of the Ohio General Code,' which made the filing of articles of incor-
poration with the secretary of state and certification by the latter,
conclusive evidence (except as against the state) of incorporation under
the Ohio laws. Previous to the amendment, a copy of the articles filed
and certified was prima facie evidence of incorporation. 2 Since 1852
Ohio has had a provision declaring that a corporate body comes into
existence upon the filing of the articles of incorporation.' At first blush,
reading these two sections together, it appears that little difficulty would
be encountered in protecting incorporators against personal liability from
collateral attack where the only step toward incorporation has been the
filing of the articles. But at what point in the steps of incorporation the
court will recognize de facto existence as a protection for incorporators
from personal liability for the transaction of business is as yet a matter
for conjecture.
'Jone, v. Hodgkis, 233 Ky. 491, 26 S.W. (2d) i 9 (193o); Ballard v. Burrows,
51 I..a Sx, go N.W. 74 (1879)i Long v. Moler, 5 Ohio St. 271 (i85S); New York
Coal Co. v. Graham, zz6 Pa. 348, 75 Atl. 657 (1go).
'Patterson v. Jones, 23S Ky. 838, 32 S.W. (znd) 408 (1930); Memmert v.
McKeen, ix Pa. 315, 4 At. 542 (S886)i Ireton v. Thomas, 84 Kan. 70, 13 Pac. 3o6
(1911).
'Erickson v. Whitescarver, 57 Col. 409, 142 Pac. 413 (1914); Helton v. Asher,
135 Ky. 751, 123 SAV. 285 (i9o9); Newsmeyer v. Roush, z Idaho io6, i2o Pac. 464
(1912).
S1i8 Ohio Laws 47, sec. I.
'Ohio Rev. Stat. (uS8o), sec. 32385 Ohio G.C. sec. 8629; now, Ohio G.C. sec.
:6z = 17.
3S. & C. see. 2735 Ohio Rev. Stat. (uSSo), sec. 3239; Ohio G.C. sec. 8627; now,
Ohio G.C. ec. 8623-7.
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A study of the early Ohio cases shows a marked conflict in the
attitude of the courts toward the commencement of corporate existence.
One line of cases held that the corporate body came into being upon the
filing of the articles,4 with one case recognizing at that point a de facto
corporation with the power to convey land without assumption of
personal liability.5 The other line of cases required further steps toward
incorporation as a requisite for corporate existence.6 Because of the
conflict in the Ohio decisions, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Kardo v.
AYdams7 attempted to harmonize them by attributing the declaration of
law in a case to the facts before the court. The court distinguished the
holdings in State v. Insurance Co. and Cemetary A4ssociation v. Traction
Co. as being too broad for the points actually involved and decided.'
The Federal Court said that under the Ohio statute then operative,
the filing of articles of incorporation followed by the transaction of cor-
porate business created a de facto corporation, although the further
provisions with respect to the issuance of stock and the election of
directors had not been lawfully complied with."0 Two Ohio cases1'
have since quoted with favor the decision in the Kardo case although
neither court was presented with a fact situation warranting the adoption
of the above statement in its entirety from the Kardo case. In the
Garwood casel"a there had been, in addition to the filing of the articles,
an election of officers and directors and subscription to the stock. The
'Ashtabula & New Lisbon R.R. Co. v. Smith, z5 Ohio St. 328 (1864); Society of
Perun v. Cleveland, 4-3 Ohio St. 481, 3 N.E. 357 (x88S).
GIn Society of Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, 3 N.E. 357 (S885), cited
supra note 4, the court recognized a de facto corporation upon the filing of the articles
for the purposes of acquiring and conveying property, holding the members immune from
personal liability where the attack was collateral.
"Powers v. Hazelton & Letonia Ry. Co., 33 Ohio St. 429 (1878)5 State ex rel. v.
Insurance Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, 31 N.E. 658, 34 Am. St. Rep. 573, 16 L.R.A. 611
(1892); Queen City Telephone Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St. 64, 76 N.E. 5o5,
50 W. L. B. 430, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 465, 5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 411, 17 Ohio C.D. 385, x5 Ohio
Dec. (N.P.) 43, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 55, 49 W.L.B. 177 (19o5); Parkside Cemetery
Assn. v. Cleveland, B. & G-L. Traction Co., 93 Ohio St. x61, s z N.E. S96, 6o W.L.B.
464 (1gs). In syllabus z of the latter case the court declared that the statutory require-
ments dealing with subscriptions of stock, paid in capital, notification of stock subscription,
and election of directors were all mandatory and therefore conditions precedent to incor-
poration.
231 Fed. 95o, 2zz Fed. 967 (1916).
"The Insurance case, cited supra note 6, turned upon the question of whether the
Insurance Company was "doing business" in Ohio and not upon its corporate existence.
The exercising of the right of eminent domain was the question involved in the Cemetery
case, cited supra note 6, and as this right has been consistently denied until further steps
toward incorporation have been taken, the case should not stand for lack of corporate
existence upon filing of the articles.
0Ohio G.C. sec. 8627.
io Kardo v. Adams, 231 Fed. 95o, at page 963.
' Garwood et al. v. The Great Western Oil Co., i Ohio App. 96 (i919); Hennegan
v. Nunner et al., z5 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) z5 (i9z4).
"aSupra note ii.
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court held that the failure to certify in writing to the secretary of state
when ten per cent of the capital stock was paid as required by Ohio G.C.
sec. 8633, then operative, did not make the members of the corporation
liable as individuals or partners, but that a de facto corporation existed.
In the Hennegan case"' a de facto corporation was declared to exist even
though the only steps taken by the incorporators were the filing of the
articles, their subscription to the stock, and investment of their property.
This decision is in line with many cases in other states holding the
incorporators and subscribers to the stock immune from personal liability
after the filing of the articles and subscription to the stock.'" Thus by
1927, when the former corporation act was superseded by the General
Corporation Act of 1927,'^ the Ohio decisions offered a fair degree of
certainty. It could then be said that a corporation came into existence
for the purposes of further organization of the corporation upon the
filing of the articles, 4 but not for the purpose of exercising the right
of eminent domain.' 5 And at least one court had recognized a de facto
corporation upon the filing of the articles and subscription to the capital
stock."
It was not until 193 1, in the case of Beck v. Stimmel," that an Ohio
court had an opportunity to apply the de facto doctrine where the only
step toward incorporation was the filing of the articles of incorporation.
Although it recognized corporate existence upon the filing of articles,
the court held the incorporators liable as joint enterprisers or partners for
negligence in the maintenance of an unlighted and unguarded elevator
shaft. In saying that "the incorporators have no authority to carry on
business in the corporate name until the corporation is legally com-
pleted,"'" the court has in effect outlawed the de facto defense by making
sections 8623-I1 and 8623-13 of the Ohio General Code, which relate
to the election of directors and payment of capital,' 9 mandatory conditions
precedent to the right to transact business. It would appear that Section
n
0b'upra note ii.
'See 5o A.L.R. 103o. The Garwood case, cited supra II, contains a good statement
.,f the de facto doctrine in the syllabus: "A de facto corporation exists where there has
been an attempt to incorporate a corporation which the law authorizes to be formed, the
alsociate3 are acting in good faith, and there has been a user of powers which such a
corporation would possess.
L3 iI2 Ohio Laws 9.
" The Glass Coating Co. v. Clark, xiS Ohio St. io, x6o N.E. 460 (i9z8).
' Powers v. Hazelton & Letonia Ry. Co., cited supra, note 6 Queen City Telephone
Co. v. City of Cincinnati, cited supra, note 6; Parkside Cemetery Assn. v. Cleveland,
B. & G-L. Traction Co., cited supra, note 6.
', Hennegan v. Nunner, cited supra, note I I.
"7Beck v. Stimmel, 39 Ohio App. 5IO, 177 N.E. 920, 35 Ohio L. Rep. i88, 1o Ohio
L. Ab,. 729, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 454 (1935).
1>Id. at 553.
' Oso G.C. sec. 86Z3-1I provides: "When subscriptions have been received in an
amount at least equal to the capital stated in the articles as that with which the corpora-
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8623-7 was interpreted by the court to mean that filing brought in
corporate existence for the purpose of further organization of the cor-
poration but not for the transaction of business. But unless Sections
8623-II and 8623-I 3 are considered mandatory, corporate existence
for the transaction of business is recognized upon compliance with Section
8623-7; and the statements in the Kardo, Henne5gan, and Garwood
cases were to the effect that compliance with all of these sections was
not a condition precedent to the transaction of business. Although Section
8623-13 states that a corporation shall not commence business until
payment of the stated capital, this section is less of a mandatory nature
when read with Section 8623-121, which imposes statutory liability
on the directors for business transacted before stated capital is paid in. 0
The latter section is clear in insuring the validity of transactions during
this period. It is suggested that the court might, by analogy, have
imposed the statutory liability under Section 8623-121 upon the incor-
porators instead of holding them liable as partners. The failure of the
court to mention Section 8623-121 in its decision may indicate that it
believed this section limited in its application to directors. Assuming
this to be true, it is suggested that Sections 8623-13 and 8623-121, by
imposing statutory liability upon the directors, do not deny the defense
of de facto existence to incorporators and subscribers to the stock in a
proper case. There is frequently informal corporate action by the incor-
porators before a board is chosen. The holding in the Beck case is made
the more confused by the court's failure to make reference to a single
case.
It is doubtful that the amendment to Section 8623-117, making the
filing conclusive evidence of incorporation when attacked collaterally,
wif have any effect on the holding of the Beck case. That court would
probably have made the same decision under the amended statute,
inasmuch as corporate existence was recognized for some purposes in
its decision. If we assume that the effect of the amendment is to change
tion will begin business, the incorporators or a majority of them shall give ten days notice
by mail to shareholders unless such notice be waived by the shareholders, to meet at such
time and place as the notice designates for the purpose of adopting regulations, electing
a board of directors and transacting any other business. The shareholders shall meet at
the time and place designated, and adopt a code of regulations and elect a board of
directors."
OHso G.C. sec. 86Z3-3 reads: "No corporation shall commence business until the
amount of capital with which it will commence business has been paid in."
' Oiso G.C. sec. 86z3-1zx reads: "If any corporation shall commence business
before there has been paid in the amount of capital specified in its articles as the amount
of capital with which it will begin business, no corporate transaction shall be invalidated
thereby, but the directors participating therein shall be jointly and severally liable for
the debts of the corporation up to an amount not exceeding in the aggregate the amount
of capital so specified in the articles until the amount of capital so specified has been
paid in."
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the law as found in the Beck case, it must eliminate all collateral
attacks after the filing of the articles (with the exception of those directed
against the directors under 8623-121). This would render obsolete the
de facto doctrine as a defense to personal liability. It is not improbable
that the cases in the future may follow any one of four different ap-
proaches to this problem. (I) The Beck case may govern, the court
recognizing corporate existence for the purposes of further organization
of the company such as accepting subscriptions and electing directors, but
requiring compliance with Section 8623-I1 and/or Section 8623-13
before granting immunity from personal liability to incorporators. (2)
The court may turn to the statement in the Kardo case, recognizing a
de facto corporation with its corresponding right to transact business
in an informal manner upon the filing of the articles of incorporation.
(3) The court may treat incorporators as directors by applying, by
analogy, the statutory liability found in Section 8623-121. (4) The
court may interpret Section 8623-117 as prohibiting collateral attack
against incorporators after the filing of the articles, thereby making a
de facto defense unnecessary.
D. A. W.
CORPORATIONS - RECORDS -RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDER TO
INSPECT AND TO COMPEL THEIR PRODUCTION
WITHIN THE STATE
I. DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS
One Cornell, a stockholder of the Nestle Le Mur Company, an Ohio
corporation, wanted to inspect the corporation's books and records. His
request to inspect the books was granted by the corporation and he was
told he could go to the New York office of the corporation at any
reasonable time to do so. But the corporation refused to disrupt its
business organization by bringing the books into Ohio as he had re-
quested.
Cornell filed a petition asking for a mandatory injunction requiring
the Nestle Le Mur Company to bring all its records to Ohio for his
examination. Upon trial the prayer for an injunction was granted.
The defendant appealed.' The court held that while it possessed the
power to compel an Ohio corporation to bring its books of account and
records into the state for purposes of examination by a stockholder,' the
'Cornell v. Nestle Le Mur Co., Ohio App. i, 29 N.E. (2d) 16z (194o).
"ld. at 4. The court relied on the case of Frank v. Nat'l Rubber Mach. Co., zz
Ohio L. Abs. S3 (1936), as establishing its power to compel production of the books
of account and records. While that case decided only that the corporation had not shown
that plaintiff stockholder's request for inspection was unreasonable or for an improper
purpose, the assumption of this court that it did have authority to compel production
